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TO FREE OR NOT TO FREE: RETHINKING 
RELEASE ORDERS UNDER THE PRISON 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT AFTER  
BROWN v. PLATA 
Kyle T. Sullivan* 
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court made one of its most contro-
versial decisions in recent memory in May 2011. Brown v. Plata involved a 
class action by inmates in California who alleged that their Eighth 
Amendment rights had been violated because overcrowding in the State’s 
prisons prevented access to adequate physical and mental health care. Af-
ter California failed to comply with previous orders to remedy those con-
ditions, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California or-
dered the State to reduce its prison population by forty-six thousand 
inmates.  Forced to either affirm the release order and jeopardize public 
safety or reverse the order and allow continued violation of prisoners’ 
Eighth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court chose the former. Under-
standably, many questioned the wisdom of both the decision and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, the statute that required it. As a result, the 
need for prison reform and alternatives to mass incarceration are clearer 
than ever. 
Introduction 
 On May 23, 2011, the United States Supreme Court upheld a court 
order releasing forty-six thousand inmates from Californian prisons, 
but the decision was by no means an easy one.1 So objectionable were 
the options before the Court in Brown v. Plata, and so grave were their 
potential consequences, that the justices may have felt themselves re-
luctant participants in a Hobsonian gameshow.2 Behind door number 
one lay reversal of the three-judge court’s order and continued over-
crowding in California’s prisons, which was already so acute that it vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2103). 
1 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923, 1928 (2011); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Tell 
California to Cut Prison Crowding, N.Y. TimesMay 24, 2011, at A1 (describing the Court’s 
decision as “ideological” and Justice Scalia and Justice Alito’s dissents as “vigorous”). 
2 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923; Liptak, supra note 1. 
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punishment.3 Behind door number two lay affirmation of the release 
order and assumption of the public safety risks associated with releasing 
thousands of prisoners.4 The Court’s 5–4 choice of this second door 
left many wondering whether a more tenable solution to prison over-
crowding might lie behind a third door that eschews the binary con-
struct presented in Plata and instead opts for systemic change in Amer-
ica’s criminal justice system.5 
 The option behind door number one was unpleasant indeed.6 Al-
though designed to hold just under eighty thousand prisoners, the in-
mate population in California’s prison system crested at more than one 
hundred and sixty thousand in 2006, and, as of August 2009, some 
prisons in the state had populations approaching three hundred per-
cent of their capacity.7 The predictable result of this arrangement was 
an increase in violence among inmates.8 
 Over time, the overcrowding in California’s prisons produced even 
more pernicious results.9 Prisoners with mental illnesses “languished 
for months” without access to care of any sort, and the ever-expanding 
inmate population led to a “four to five-year gap in the availability of 
sufficient beds” for the proper treatment of such inmates.10 In lieu of 
adequate personnel and treatment beds, suicidal inmates were often 
“held for prolonged periods in telephone booth-sized cages without 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923–28 (describing unsanitary conditions in California’s pris-
ons); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 1, 6–9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 
2009), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2009/08/04/Opinion% 
20&%20Order%20FINAL.pdf. 
4 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923; Coleman, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 9. 
5 See Craig M. Bradley, The Right Remedy for Crowded Prisons, 47 Trial; Allison Torres 
Burtka, The Problem with Prisons, 47 Trial 24, 26 (2011). See generally John W. Parry, Supreme 
Court Embraces Minimal Relief for California Prisoners with Mental Disabilities and Other Serious 
Health Care Needs, 35 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 545 (2011). 
6 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. 
7 See id.; Coleman, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 7. Thousands of prisoners were as-
signed to triple-bunks in gymnasiums, as many as fifty-four prisoners were made to share a 
single toilet, and in some cases two hundred prisoners were also forced to share six show-
ers. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1924; Coleman, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 7, 72. 
8 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1933–34. In one memorable incident, a prisoner died after an 
assault by fellow inmates in a dormitory-gymnasium; the area was so understaffed that 
correctional officers did not learn of the death until hours later. Id.; see also Michelle Pa-
rilo, Protecting Prisoners During Custodial Interrogations: The Road Forward After Howes v. 
Fields, 33 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 217, 234–37 (2013) (describing the many forms of prison 
violence). 
9 See id.; Coleman, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 72. 
10 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926. 
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toilets.”11 Inmates not fortunate enough to receive even this modicum 
of care were largely unsupervised.12 
 The plight of prisoners with physical illnesses told a similar story.13 
Like the “telephone booth-sized cages” used to hold suicidal inmates, 
one prison held fifty inmates in a twelve– by twenty–foot cage for nearly 
five hours while they awaited medical treatment.14 Elsewhere, a prisoner 
died after his testicular cancer went untreated for seventeen months, 
and in San Quentin, a prisoner died from renal failure after going three 
months without receiving a consultation that should have occurred 
within fourteen days of his diagnosis.15 The severe understaffing that 
caused these and other deaths was compounded by the lack of basic 
sanitation, absence of medical equipment, and incompetence of prison 
medical staff.16 Of particular concern was the spread of communicable 
diseases which, in light of crowded conditions, amounted to system-wide 
pestilences.17 In San Quentin alone, facilities were so “antiquated, dirty, 
poorly staffed, [and] poorly maintained,” and medical equipment was 
so “inadequate,” that they posed a “public health and life-safety risk” to 
inmates and employees alike.18 These conditions were not unique to 
San Quentin.19 One expert declared that California’s prisons as a whole 
were “breeding grounds for disease,” and another determined that sub-
standard care was “widespread” and that an “extremely high” propor-
tion of inmate deaths in California were either “possibly preventable or 
preventable.”20 With one California inmate dying needlessly every week, 
                                                                                                                      
11 Id. at 1924. 
12 See id. at 1933–34. In two such cases, prisoners hanged themselves after being as-
signed to cells that prison staff knew could support a noose but could not fix “because 
doing so would involve removing [the] prisoners from the cells” in question and holding 
them in alternative space that did not exist. Id. at 1934. 
13 Id. at 1925. 
14 See id. at 1924–25. 
15 See id. at 1925, 1927. 
16 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1927. Expert testimony revealed that hiring and retaining 
competent medical staff was difficult because of the “culture of cynicism, fear, and despair” 
in the prison environment. Id. As a result, California’s prisons were often forced to “hire 
any doctor who had a license, a pulse, and a pair of shoes.” Id. 
17 See id. at 1933; Coleman, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 7. “Infectious diseases 
prevalent in prisons include Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, HIV/AIDS, and MRSA, sexually 
transmitted diseases . . . and airborne diseases such as tuberculosis . . . studies in the late 
90’s . . . indicated rates of HIV were eight to ten times higher than in the general public, 
rates of Hepatitis C nine to ten times higher, rates of TB four to 17 times higher, and that 
10 percent to 20 percent of inmates suffered from grave mental illness.” Maureen Mullen 
Dove, Law and Fact of Health Care in Prisons, 44 Md. Bar J. 4, 11 (2011). 
18 See Coleman, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 7, 15. 
19 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1934. 
20 Id. at 1925; Coleman, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 72. 
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then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger declared a state of emergency in 
the State’s prisons in October of 2006, condemning them as places of 
“extreme peril.”21 
 Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that the option behind 
door number one was unacceptable.22 Writing for the majority in Plata, 
Justice Kennedy ruled that the conditions in California’s prisons— spe-
cifically, the unavailability of adequate medical and mental health care 
due to overcrowding—violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.23 With the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA) as his guide, Justice Kennedy affirmed a special 
three-judge panel’s conclusion that the only way to remedy these viola-
tions was through a prison population cap which, absent the financial 
resources to build and staff more prisons, would require the release of 
as many as forty-six thousand inmates.24 To be sure, Justice Kennedy 
and the majority did not take this decision lightly; they acknowledged 
that an action of such “unprecedented sweep and extent” raised “grave 
concern[s]” for public safety.25 Thus, per the PLRA’s requirements, the 
majority affirmed the release order only after determining that it was 
narrowly tailored to correct the Eighth Amendment violations in ques-
tion and that its necessity outweighed concerns for public safety.26 
 What lay behind door number two—the release of tens of thou-
sands of convicted felons—was equally unpalatable.27 Justices Scalia 
and Alito, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts, respec-
tively, raised this concern in separate and unusually aggressive dis-
sents.28 Maligning the majority’s decision as “the most radical injunc-
tion issued by a court in our Nation’s history,” Justice Scalia’s dissent 
began by reminding the Court that the forty-six thousand “convicted 
felons” it ordered released would “undoubtedly be fine physical speci-
mens who have developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Coleman, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 7, 43. 
22 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. 
23 See id. at 1947. 
24 See id. at 1944–47. 
25 See id. at 1923. 
26 See generally id. at 1928–1947 (applying the PLRA to determine that the release order 
was the necessary, narrowly tailored, and least intrusive means of remedying the Eighth 
Amendment violations, and that it was not outweighed by concerns for public safety). 
27 See generally id. at 1950–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the grave risks to 
public safety posed by a mass-release of prisoners); id. at 1959–68 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(echoing Justice Scalia’s public safety concerns). 
28 See generally Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1959–68 (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
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prison gym.”29 Public safety concerns aside, Justice Scalia also found 
the Court’s decision troubling as a matter of law.30 The release order 
imposed a “‘structural injunction’” requiring judicial oversight of the 
entire California prison system, a task that exceeded the Court’s exper-
tise and constitutional authority.31 Likewise, Justice Scalia criticized the 
Court’s methodology as nothing more than “the dressing-up of policy 
judgments as factual findings.”32 While Justice Scalia did not believe 
that such findings were made in bad faith, he emphasized that the judi-
ciary’s relative inexperience in running social institutions counseled 
against finding facts in a way that directed a mass-release of prisoners.33 
Such was the crux of Justice Scalia’s dissent—common sense and prin-
ciples of judicial restraint militated against the release of forty-six thou-
sand convicted criminals into the general population.34 
 Justice Alito’s dissent similarly declared that “[t]he Constitution 
does not give federal judges the authority to run state penal systems.”35 
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Alito believed this conclusion to be dictated 
by concern for the separation of powers, the tenets of federalism, and 
the serious public safety concerns of releasing prisoners.36 Justice Alito 
was particularly concerned with the apparent haste with which the 
Court took the “radical and dangerous step” of affirming the release of 
“46,000 criminals—the equivalent of three Army divisions.”37 Anything short 
of absolute exhaustion of intermediate remedial measures would 
“gambl[e] with the safety of the people of California” in a way that 
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. at 1950, 1953 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
30 Id. at 1951. 
31 See id. at 1953, 1956 (noting that “‘structural injunctions’” imposed on States by fed-
eral courts violate the separation of powers and precepts of federalism). 
32 See id. at 1955. Professor Dan M. Kahan describes Justice Scalia’s criticism as “aporetic” 
and therefore, perhaps, moot. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Moti-
vated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev.1, 66 (2011). Justice 
Scalia’s remonstrance that the Court “bend every effort to read the law in such a way as to” 
avoid the prisoner release suggests that he engaged in the selfsame “dressing-up of policy 
judgments as factual findings.” See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950, 1955 (Scalia, J., dissenting). After 
all, if “it is impossible for judges to make ‘factual findings’ without inserting their own policy 
judgments,” it seems that Justice Scalia’s criticism is more properly directed at the factfinding 
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act than at the judges who “find” facts under its 
auspices. See id. at 1954. 
33 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950, 1954–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
34 Id. at 1950, 1957–58. 
35 Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 1959, 1963 (emphasis in original). 
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would “lead to a grim roster of victims,” just as previous release orders 
had.38 
 Despite their differences, the Justices agreed “that general over-
crowding contribute[d] to many of the California [prison] system’s 
healthcare problems.”39 Thus, the solution in Brown v. Plata may have 
lain behind a third door—one that considers overcrowding not as 
something to be fixed, but as something to be prevented from the out-
set.40 Although the PLRA—the statute that gave the Court the authority 
to either affirm or reverse the lower court’s release order—did not pre-
sent this third option in Plata, it has received renewed support from 
those on both sides of the Plata decision.41 For those who argue that 
the Court offered only temporary relief for a systemic problem, a re-
form of the penal system that emphasizes proactive measures aspires to 
permanent eradication of Eighth Amendment violations.42 The fewer 
people who are imprisoned, the less likely are prison staff and re-
sources to be overwhelmed.43 For those who believe that public safety is 
paramount, the proactive model ensures that prison conditions never 
again will become so acute as to force the “improvident” release of con-
victed criminals.44 The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it is 
largely chimerical.45 Few states or municipalities have completely suc-
ceeded in implementing a system that avoids prison overcrowding by 
preventing crime before it begins, and such efforts on the federal level 
have yet to begin in earnest.46 
                                                                                                                      
 
38 See id. at 1965–68. The “prior prisoner release order” to which Justice Alito referred 
was the one attempted in Philadelphia in the early 1990s for the same reasons and with 
disastrous consequences for public safety. See id.; infra notes 149–170 and accompanying 
text. 
39 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929–30; id. at 1951 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1963 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
40 See Bradley, supra note 5, at 56; Burtka, supra note 5, at 26; Parry, supra note 5, at 
546. 
41 See Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1956 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Burtka, supra note 5, at 26–28. 
42 See Bradley, supra note 5, at 56; Burtka, supra note 5, at 26–28; Parry, supra note 5, at 
546. 
43 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1933–34; Coleman, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, at 72. 
44 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the grave risks to 
public safety posed by a mass-release of prisoners); id. at 1959–68 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(echoing Justice Scalia’s public safety concerns). 
45 Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass In-
carceration, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L133, 137 (2011). 
46 See Andrew W. Amend, Note, Giving Precise Content to the Eighth Amendment: An Assess-
ment of the Remedial Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 143, 169–70 
(2008). See generally Pew Ctr. on the States, State of Recidivism: The Revolving Door 
of America’s Prisons 1 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter State of Recidivism], available at http:// 
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 The PLRA and the Plata decision are laudable to the extent that 
they are an indictment of the American penal system’s dependence on 
incarceration.47 But to the extent that the Court’s decision, as de-
manded by the PLRA, is only a half-measure for a problem that re-
quires a full solution, it should be viewed as a call for more comprehen-
sive change.48 The purpose of this Note is to heed that call by offering 
an alternative to the PLRA that shifts the American penal system away 
from its preference for imprisonment and toward other forms of sanc-
tion that address the interest in rehabilitating criminals, rather than 
just incapacitating them; conserve fiscal and administrative resources; 
and reconcile the constitutional concerns raised by Justices Kennedy, 
Scalia, and Alito in Plata.49 Support for this proposal will be presented 
in five parts. Part I reviews the history of the American criminal justice 
system in the twentieth century with an eye toward the ideologies that 
have impelled the rise of the prison state and its concomitant, the 
PLRA. Part II examines criticisms of the PLRA and suggests that the 
Act’s malleability indicates the need for a more definitive solution to 
prison overcrowding from the legislature. Part III considers historical 
parallels to Plata’s release order as predictors of its potential impact. 
Part IV explores the success of efforts in other states to supplant im-
prisonment with alternative sanctions and preventive measures. Part V 
draws on the findings of Parts II, III, and IV to recommend ways that 
each of the three branches of government can help to reduce Amer-
ica’s prison population. Finally, this Note concludes by observing that, 
though incomplete and imperfect, the proposed measures can serve as 
a foundation for the long-awaited reform of the American penal sys-
tem. 
                                                                                                                      
www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_cor-rections/ 
State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf (citing “[t]he dramatic growth 
of America’s prison population during the past three decades” and exploring alternatives to 
incarceration); Taslitz, supra note 45, at 138–52 (analyzing California, New York, and Wash-
ington as the states that represent the three main approaches to incarceration in the United 
States and demonstrating that none of the three approaches is completely successful). 
47 See Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928; 
see also Burtka, supra note 5, at 27–28; Parry, supra note 5, at 545. 
48 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626; Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1928; see also Bradley, supra note 5, at 56; 
Burtka, supra note 5, at 27–28; Parry, supra note 5, at 546. 
49 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928; id. at 1950–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1959–68 (Alito, 
J., dissenting); State of Recidivism, supra note 46, at 1; Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell 
Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s 
Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 Geo. L.J.1385, 1401–02 (2006). 
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I. The Road to Plata: Rise of the American Prison State 
 Criminal justice blossomed as a political issue in the presidential 
election of 1968 when Republican challenger Richard Nixon made “law 
and order” a priority of his campaign, and famously accused Democ-
ratic incumbent Lyndon Johnson of being “soft-on-crime.”50 Nixon also 
ascribed the rising crime rate to the liberal activism of the Warren 
Court, whose decisions consistently favored the rights of defendants in 
criminal cases.51 Thus, the Republican platform emphasized the need 
to “‘re-establish the principle that men are accountable for what they 
do,’” while the Democratic platform lamented a society that forced in-
dividuals to “‘resort to violence.’”52 With this partisan contrast drawn, a 
candidate’s willingness to combat crime through stiffer law enforce-
ment measures would be a critical matter in national elections forever 
more.53 
  Indeed, the moral tenor of Nixon’s 1968 campaign was echoed by 
President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. For Reagan, crime was not 
something to be prevented or excused as it was during Johnson’s Great 
Society; rather, it was a moral failing to be punished and repressed.54 
                                                                                                                      
 
50 See Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 49, at 1396. 
51 See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (applying the Sixth Amend-
ment right to trial by jury to the States); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (applying 
the exclusionary rule to Fifth Amendment violations by the States); Gideon v. Wainwright 
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the States); Clay-
ton & Pickerill, supra note 49, at 1399–1400. As Professors Cornell W. Clayton and J. 
Mitchell Pickerill observe, Nixon’s criticism of the Warren Court was part of his “‘southern 
strategy,’” which sought to secure the votes of Southern Democrats by “tap[ping] into 
southern resentment of the Court without having to repudiate the substance of [its] civil 
rights reforms.” Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 49, at 1399. Thus, Nixon’s attack on the 
Warren Court was in reality a roundabout way of attacking the Democrats’ allegedly soft 
position on crime. See id. Every promise to appoint “‘strict constructionist[]’” judges who 
would restore “‘the ‘forgotten civil right’ of public order” and read criminal defendants’ 
rights more narrowly than the Warren Court was meant to foreground the difference be-
tween Democrats and Republicans in matters of criminal justice. See id. at 1399–1400. 
52 See Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 49, at 1400–01 (quoting Political Party Platforms: Re-
publican Party Platform of 1968, Am. Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/index.php?pid=25841#axzz1py74wlp3 (last visited May 17, 2013), and Political Party Plat-
forms: Democratic Party Platform of 1968, Am. Presidency Project, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29604#axzz1py74wlp3 (last visited May 17, 2013)). Likewise, 
where the Republican platform cast law as “‘the cornerstone of a free and well-ordered soci-
ety,’” the Democratic platform cautioned against using the law to “‘foster injustice’” and 
“‘curtail[] the hard-won liberties of all Americans.’” See id. at 1400–01 (quoting Political Party 
Platforms: Republication Party Platform of 1968, supra, and Political Platforms: Democratic Party 
Platform of 1968, supra). 
53 See id. at 1400. 
54 Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment, John J. Newman & John M. 
Schmalbach, United States History: Preparing for the Advanced Placement Ex-
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And like Nixon’s campaign in 1968, Reagan’s 1980 campaign exploited 
“the political power of the crime issue” by explicitly linking it to “liberal 
permissiveness” and advocating a more robust mandatory sentencing 
program, as well as renewed reliance on the death penalty.55 Reagan’s 
successor, George H.W. Bush, continued this trend in his successful bid 
for the presidency in 1988.56 The Bush Administration marked the fifth 
victory by a Republican presidential candidate in six elections.57 If 
nothing else, this pattern made clear the enduring power of criminal 
justice as an emotive issue, and its strong correlation to the success of 
candidates for national office.58 
 The Democratic Party could not help but notice this trend, and for 
the election of 1992 they nominated a candidate capable of exploiting 
it.59 A southern governor with progressive-center leanings, Bill Clinton 
of Arkansas understood that the term “liberal” had become pejorative, 
and that the Democratic Party needed to change its identity in order to 
change its fortunes.60 Thus, during his two terms in office Clinton ap-
propriated the Republicans’ calls for tougher laws, harsher sentencing, 
and victims’ rights, and by the end of his second term, there was no 
meaningful difference between the criminal justice platforms of the 
Democratic and Republican Parties.61 
 Clinton’s decision to embrace conservative crime policy normal-
ized the notion of “prevention through incapacitation and retribu-
tion.”62 This normalization set the nation on a path toward increased 
rates of incarceration, which would in turn produce the overcrowding 
and dire conditions catalogued by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata 
                                                                                                                      
amination 644 (2004); Steve Hoenisch, Crime Policy of the Republican Party, Criticism.Com 
( July 28, 2004), http://www.criticism.com/policy/republicans-crime-policy.php. This was 
particularly true of Reagan’s efforts to combat the domestic effects of the burgeoning 
international drug trade. See Hoenisch, supra. See generally Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: 
The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (describing the Reagan administration’s 
efforts to dismantle the Colombian drug trade using United States military and intelli-
gence resources). Just as federal agencies sought to stem the flow of illegal drugs from 
South to North America, Reagan’s wife, Nancy, embarked on the “Just Say No” campaign, 
the message of which was that drug use, and by extension crime generally, were moral 
choices within the individual’s control. See Hoenisch, supra. See generally Bowden, supra. 
55 See Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 49, at 1404; Hoenisch, supra note 54. 
56 See Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 49, at 1396–97, 1404–06; Hoenisch, supra note 54. 
57 See Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 49, at 1406. 
58 See id. at 1400, 1406. 
59 See id. at 1406. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 1409–10. 
62 See id. 
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nearly fifteen years later.63 It is little coincidence that Coleman v. Brown, 
one of the two cases that later became Brown v. Plata, was filed in 1990, 
just as the effects of Presidents Reagan and Bush’s policies were first 
being felt.64 Indeed, the American public may have unwittingly ex-
changed the specter of “crime in the streets” for the curtailment of the 
“‘hard-won liberties of all Americans.’”65 
 The national crime debate was particularly relevant in California.66 
After the sit-ins and demonstrations by students at the University of 
California Berkeley in the fall of 1964 and the violent race riots in 
South Central Los Angeles in the summer of 1965, many Californians 
began to doubt their government’s ability to enforce the law and keep 
the peace.67 Not surprisingly, in 1966 voters proved receptive to guber-
natorial candidate Ronald Reagan’s characterization of crime as a 
moral failing that should be dealt with severely.68 Indeed, Reagan’s 
moral message translated into electoral and legislative success.69 Senate 
Bill (SB) 85-87, popularly known as the Reagan-Deukmejian penalty 
package, gave legal effect to Reagan’s crime rhetoric by foregrounding 
crime victims’ pain and suffering as a justification for heightened man-
datory minimum sentences.70 The most significant aspect of SB 85-87 
might be its “delayed but cumulative effect over time” on prison over-
crowding.71 With prisoners committed to longer sentences, the turn-
over in California’s prison system was reduced and new inmates began 
literally “stacking up” with old ones.72  
                                                                                                                      
63 See Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 49, at 1409–10; see also Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923–28. 
64 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926. 
65 See Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 49, at 1401 (quoting Political Party Platforms: De-
mocratic Party Platform of 1968, supra note 52); Hoenisch, supra note 54. 
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id. at 62–63 
69 See id. at 68. 
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71 Id. at 68. 
72 See id.; see also Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1924; Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-
0520 LKK JFM P, at 1, 7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ 
datastore/general/2009/08/04/Opinion%20&%20Order%20FINAL.pdf. 
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 This retributive model ripened during the remainder of the cen-
tury.73 In 1976, Governor Jerry Brown oversaw the passage of SB 42, 
known as the California Determinate Sentencing Law, which replaced 
the state’s flexible sentencing model with a system of fixed prison terms 
and gave judges the discretion to lengthen prison sentences.74 Simi-
larly, the 1982 passage of Proposition 8, the Victims’ Bill of Rights, 
amended the California State Constitution by increasing prison terms 
and also allowing victims and their families to influence sentencing de-
cisions.75 Finally, in 1994, Californians approved the Sentencing En-
hancement Repeat Offenders initiative, a three-strikes provision requir-
ing more severe sanctions for repeat offenders.76 The cumulative effect 
of the retributive policies established by Reagan and perpetuated by his 
successors made prison overcrowding an intractable problem in the 
state.77 And just as Reagan’s policies took decades to reach fruition, so 
too will any attempt to change California’s sentencing scheme and un-
derlying perceptions of criminality.78 Thus, Brown v. Plata may be the 
first in a long line of cases that documents California’s prison over-
crowding before the crisis is resolved.79 
II. The Wolf in Reform’s Clothing: Counterremedial 
Constructs of the PLRA 
 As the ranks of America’s prisons swelled, conditions of confine-
ment deteriorated.80 By 1998, at least one prison in forty-eight of Amer-
ica’s fifty-three jurisdictions was found to be in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment; sanitation and essential resources were so lacking that life 
in the facilities constituted “cruel and unusual punishment.”81 Inmates, 
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however, did not bear silent witness to the squalor and disease that sur-
rounded them—in 2005, an estimated ten percent of all civil suits filed 
in federal courts were complaints brought by prisoners, and in the 
1990s, the National Association of Attorneys General estimated that 
inmate lawsuits cost upwards of eighty million dollars annually.82 The 
rise in inmate litigation had three primary effects.83 First, federal courts 
began issuing injunctions and consent decrees that either required the 
release of prisoners to maintain prison populations at sustainable levels, 
or mandated costly internal reforms to ensure compliance with the 
Eighth Amendment.84 Prison managers complained that these meas-
ures limited their ability to use “ingenuity and initiative” in solving 
problems unique to their prisons, and federalists decried the measures 
as an intrusion by the federal government into the affairs of state and 
local entities.85 Second, the cost of prison overcrowding and substan-
dard conditions began to be externalized—as suffering inmates 
brought suit against federal, state, and local governments, “[t]axpayers 
footed the hefty bill” for the defense.86 Third, because federal courts 
were inundated with prison litigation, fewer judicial resources were 
available to adjudicate other pressing matters.87 In the aggregate, the 
trend spawned by the retributive criminal justice system had reached 
critical mass by the late-1990s.88 Increasingly, the pleas of prisoners toil-
ing in cruel and unusual conditions were no longer stifled by prison 
walls, but were instead resonating in courts of law and with citizens who 
reluctantly subsidized the defense of the prison system.89 But while the 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 4109 Before The Subcomm. on 
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demand for change was widespread, support for the form it ultimately 
took was not.90 
A. Goals and Provisions of the PLRA 
 The legislative history of the PLRA is sparse, but its aims are clear.91 
First, because of the judiciary’s perceived lack of expertise in supervising 
large social institutions, the PLRA was meant to limit judicial oversight 
of the prison system.92 Second, the PLRA sought to reduce administra-
tive burdens on courts by curbing frivolous inmate litigation.93 
 Pursuant to this first aim, the PLRA limits the circumstances in 
which a court may remedy prison conditions through injunctions and 
consent decrees.94 Where federal district courts once made such orders 
routinely, the PLRA establishes a number of ancillary requirements that 
must be met first.95 Namely, the court must ensure that a preliminary 
injunction against a prison—the first form of relief sought by prisoners 
living in substandard conditions—is “narrowly drawn, extend[s] no fur-
ther than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires pre-
liminary relief, and [is] the least intrusive means necessary to correct 
that harm.”96 After submitting the preliminary injunction to this “need-
narrowness-intrusiveness” test, the court must then “give substantial 
weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a 
criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief . . . .”97 Even 
after satisfying this rigorous standard, a preliminary injunction auto-
matically expires ninety days after its entry “unless the court makes [an 
order for prospective relief] . . . before the expiration of the 90-day pe-
                                                                                                                      
90 See Hearing on H.R. 4109, supra note 82, at 2. See generally Lynn S. Branham, The 
Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What Con-
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91 See Hearing on H.R. 4109, supra note 82, at 1–2; Branham, supra note 90, at 488, 537–
39; Amend, supra note 46, at 156–57. 
92 See Hearing on H.R. 4109, supra note 82, at 1–2; Amend, supra note 46, at 156–57. 
93 See Hearing on H.R. 4109, supra note 82, at 1–2; White, supra note 82. 
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generally Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006) (limiting circumstances in 
which a prison release order may be issued and requiring that intermediate remedial 
measures be given “a reasonable amount of time” to succeed). 
95 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626; Hearing on H.R. 4109, supra note 82, at 1. 
96 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 
97 See id.; Amend, supra note 46, at 157. 
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riod.”98 An order for prospective relief must satisfy the same “need-
narrowness-intrusiveness” test, though additionally it must be deter-
mined that the relief is necessary to correct the violation of a federal 
right, and that no other relief will correct that violation.99 And just as 
preliminary injunctions are subject to time constraints, subsection (b) 
of the PLRA allows termination of prospective relief two years after the 
date the court grants it or one year after the court denies an initial mo-
tion requesting termination of the relief.100 In such cases, subsection 
(b) also places the burden of proving that relief is still required on the 
prisoners, rather than on prison administrators.101 As some have ob-
served, this arrangement is unfair because the prisoners have already 
proven the need for prospective relief and should not be made to do so 
again.102 
 Prisoner release orders like the one entered in Plata are subject to 
even greater limitations.103 Under the PLRA, prisoner release orders 
may be issued only when a specially convened three-judge court finds 
that: the prison has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with 
previous orders for less intrusive relief; “crowding is the primary cause 
of the violation of [the] Federal right” in question; and “no other relief 
will remedy [that] violation.”104 
 Together with the provisions designed to deter frivolous litigation, 
the PLRA’s restrictions on judicial remedies form “a whole range of ob-
stacles and pitfalls” for prisoners seeking vindication of their Eighth 
Amendment rights.105 It is unclear, however, if this was the intention of 
Congress or the President in passing the PLRA.106 Some may have with-
held support for the Act had they known that it would perpetuate the 
type of Eighth Amendment violations documented in Brown v. Plata, 
                                                                                                                      
98 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 
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100 See § 3626(b). 
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White, supra note 82, § 4. 
106 See Branham, supra note 90, at 537–39. 
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and others who understood the PLRA as a way “to filter out the bad 
claims and facilitate consideration of the good ones” would likely rec-
ommend that Congress “‘go back to the drawing board.’”107 Before do-
ing so, however, the flaws of the PLRA should be placed in context.108 
B. Criticisms of the PLRA 
 The need for revision of the PLRA is clear from a review of its dis-
crete provisions and their cumulative effect, but these criticisms alone 
are not enough.109 Lasting reform demands a more exacting inquiry 
into the policy missteps that allowed the PLRA to take shape.110 Specifi-
cally, the PLRA’s consistency with the legislative process required by the 
Constitution, effect on the contours of the Bill of Rights, implications 
for prison reform, and utility as a rubric for adjudication all merit 
closer scrutiny.111 The results of this scrutiny, coupled with an under-
standing of the mechanics of the PLRA, provide a cautionary tale for 
those intent on future reform.112 
1. The PLRA as Legislative Subterfuge 
 To claim that the PRLA was passed “with strong bipartisan support 
and the support of the Clinton Administration” is something of a half-
truth.113 Because the PLRA was passed as an appropriations bill rider, it 
might not have received the same “strong bipartisan support” had it 
been submitted for legislative and executive review as a standalone 
bill.114 On the contrary, the PLRA’s passage was more a function of fis-
cal exigency than of sound policy.115 The appropriations bill in whose 
“fine print” the PLRA was buried was enacted by a desperate Congress 
after months of budgetary crisis, and the PLRA’s sparse legislative his-
tory attests to the cursory review it received amid the clangor.116 
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 The difficulty with inserting provisions like the PLRA into omnibus 
appropriations bills is that they circumvent the deliberative process re-
quired by Article I of the Constitution.117 Such provisions often escape 
legislators’ attention, and the result is policy that runs contrary to the 
intent of Congress and the interests of the people.118 And just as legisla-
tors are hard-pressed to give full consideration to individual provisions 
in a sweeping appropriations bill, the President has neither the time 
nor the constitutional authority to review and excise individual provi-
sions from an omnibus budget bill.119 Thus, a primary criticism of the 
PLRA is not that it is bad law, but that it is not law in the truest sense.120 
Legislation-by-misdirection may meet the technical requirements of 
bicameralism and presentment, but such formalism undermines the 
spirit of the Constitution and, in the case of the PLRA, facilitates viola-
tion of prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights.121 
2. The PLRA as Arbiter of Constitutional Rights 
 In addition to straining the precepts of the legislative process, the 
PLRA also reduces the Eighth Amendment from a steadfast prohibition 
to a mere advisory dictum with a generous “margin for toleration.”122 
By limiting the circumstances in which the Eighth Amendment may be 
enforced, the PLRA encourages prisons to “[o]perate on the [m]argins 
of [c]ruelty.”123 The PLRA thus functions as something of a self-
fulfilling prophecy: the Act is suffused with the language of limitation, 
and prison administrators, secure in the knowledge of these limitations, 
have a reduced incentive to fulfill what would otherwise be a constitu-
tional duty.124 
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 The PLRA also strains the Equal Protection provisions of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments because it creates “a separate but unequal 
system of access to courts that applies only to prisoners.”125 If the protec-
tions of these Amendments are as absolute as their language suggests, 
then the PLRA’s limitation of them based on one’s status as a criminal is 
inherently unconstitutional.126 Moreover, the application of the PLRA to 
pretrial detainees who retain the presumption of innocence and to ju-
venile detainees who are deemed civil offenders rather than criminals 
curtails constitutional rights beyond even the PLRA’s own justifica-
tions.127 To the extent that the PLRA restricts these rights outside of the 
Article V amendment process, its legality is questionable.128 
3. The PLRA as Impediment to Change 
 As the district court in Plata observed in a 2005 order, another 
principal flaw of the PLRA is its failure to comprehend substandard 
prison conditions as a “polycentric” issue.129 In what appears to be an 
internal contradiction, the PLRA’s “language invites scrutiny of pro-
posed relief with a presumption against it.”130 That is, the PLRA high-
lights the many “subsidiary problem ‘centers’” associated with prison 
overcrowding, but the “needs-narrowness-intrusiveness test,” coupled 
with the requirement that courts give substantial weight to concerns for 
public safety and the criminal justice system, prohibits a polycentric so-
lution.131 Likewise, the PLRA’s requirement that courts terminate relief 
orders upon compliance, even in the face of likely relapse, and the abil-
ity of prison administrators to move for termination of relief at specific 
junctures, regardless of compliance, militate against lasting reform.132 
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This counterremedial orientation impedes the courts in their role as a 
guarantor of prisoners’ constitutional rights.133 
4. The PLRA as Legislative Indeterminacy 
 Justice Scalia’s dissent in Plata echoes a final criticism of the PLRA: 
that the Act’s operative terms are pliable to the point of uselessness.134 
Where Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion applied the “need-narrow- 
ness-intrusiveness” test to find that the prisoner release order was nec-
essary, sufficiently narrowly tailored, and the least intrusive means of 
correcting the Eighth Amendment violations in California’s prisons, 
Justices Scalia and Alito used the same statutory language to direct the 
opposite result.135 For Justice Scalia, a statewide prisoner release order 
was neither narrowly drawn nor the least intrusive means of remedying 
the Eighth Amendment violations in specific prisons.136 Similarly, Jus-
tice Alito found that the release order was premature because remedies 
short of a prisoner release could bring California’s prisons into compli-
ance with the Eighth Amendment.137 Nor does the PLRA describe how 
to account for the “substantial weight” of the public safety analysis.138 
Justice Kennedy found that public safety concerns did not outweigh the 
need for a prisoner release, while Justices Scalia and Alito found that 
they did.139 The lack of precise meaning in the PLRA’s terms renders it 
little more than a flaccid judicial test that allows prisoners’ constitu-
tional rights to hang in the balance.140 
III. Lessons from a Checkered Past: Philadelphia’s  
Pretrial Release Orders 
 The PLRA’s contemplation of large-scale release orders was not 
without precedent.141 When Brown v. Plata came before the Court, 
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many, including Justice Alito, were reminded of a similar situation that 
occurred in Philadelphia some twenty years prior.142 In the 1987 case 
Harris v. Pernsley, inmates filed a class action lawsuit alleging that over-
crowding in Holmesburg Prison violated the Eighth Amendment.143 
Based on evidence submitted by the prisoners and the City of Philadel-
phia, and upon the court’s own tour of Holmesburg, a federal district 
judge approved a consent decree through which the City would im-
plement a gradual population reduction in its prison system.144 Omi-
nously, the district court declined to suggest possible methods for 
achieving the reduction, stating that: “[t]he implementation of these 
maximum allowable populations is left in the first instance to the City 
defendants and the Pennsylvania [state] courts.”145 While the court’s 
directive was issued with “the best of intentions,” its demurral on this 
difficult point—how to release prisoners without compromising public 
safety—perhaps betrayed its misgivings about the very notion of release 
orders as a way of remedying Eighth Amendment violations.146 
 The Supreme Court took a similar tack in Plata, choosing “to ac-
cord the State considerable latitude to find mechanisms and make 
plans to correct the violations in a prompt and effective way consistent 
with public safety.”147 Concerns for the limits of judicial expertise war-
ranted restraint in both cases, but the outcome in Philadelphia demon-
strates that prison systems are no better equipped than courts for the 
task of releasing prisoners in large numbers.148 
A. Implications of the Philadelphia Population Cap 
 The fact that Philadelphia’s mayor agreed to release only “non-
violent” offenders did little to allay concerns for public safety.149 In-
deed, Philadelphians’ fears about the prison population cap were vali-
dated during an eighteen-month period from January 1993 through 
June 1994, when city police rearrested 9732 prisoners who were re-
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leased because of the cap.150 Among the charges filed against the re-
leased prisoners were 79 murders, 1113 assaults, 959 robberies, 264 
firearms violations, and 90 rapes.151 With District Attorney Lynne Abra-
ham and Mayor Edward Rendell unable to terminate the population 
cap, it appeared that the city would be overwhelmed by crime.152 
 Sarah Vandenbraak, an Assistant District Attorney who partici-
pated in the Pernsley settlement, also observed that the population cap 
was as important for the criminals it forced the City to overlook as for 
the ones it forced the City to release.153 In 1994, Philadelphia judges 
released 15,000 “non-violent” criminal defendants—including those 
charged with manslaughter, gun crimes, and aggravated robbery— be-
cause the population cap prevented their detention in the City’s al-
ready-full jails.154 That courts’ hands were tied was not lost on criminals, 
who began flocking to Philadelphia to ply their trade.155 Overall, the 
number of fugitives in Philadelphia increased from 18,000 to nearly 
50,000 under the population cap, and the rate of recidivism among 
prisoners released under the cap was eighteen percent, more than 
double the rate for those released under normal state bail proce-
dures.156 While the population cap may have helped to remedy the 
conditions in Philadelphia’s prisons, many questioned whether resi-
dents should have paid the price in public safety.157 
 The population cap also vitiated other initiatives meant to reduce 
pressure on Philadelphia’s prison system.158 Drug treatment programs 
and bail arrangements were reduced to nullities because the underly-
ing enforcement mechanism—the threat of imprisonment—was inop-
erable.159 The result was a culture of flagrant lawlessness where crimi-
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nals both knew and acted as though they were beyond the reach of jus-
tice.160 
 Ironically, the population cap also imposed greater long-term costs 
on Philadelphia’s criminal justice system.161 Because alternative treat-
ment programs were impotent without the backing of imprisonment, 
criminals who might otherwise have been rehabilitated at low cost after 
their first offense were allowed to recidivate until their records war-
ranted a prison sentence.162 In short, the population cap produced 
more cases requiring imprisonment because it eliminated all other re-
habilitative options.163 This single-solution model also increased costs 
because imprisonment did not reduce recidivism as effectively as 
treatment programs, and thereby created the need to adjudicate and 
punish otherwise preventable crimes.164 
 Perhaps the most significant failure of Philadelphia’s population 
cap was the regression that it ultimately produced.165 With memories of 
the cap’s effect on public safety still fresh, lawmakers retreated to a 
criminal justice model predicated on incapacitation, and Philadelphia’s 
incarceration rates rose accordingly.166 The city’s prison population 
grew by forty-five percent from 1999 through 2008, and the total spend-
ing on jails during the same period rivaled that of cities with much lar-
ger populations.167 Although Philadelphia’s prison population and 
spending decreased slightly in mid-2009, it seems that the failure of the 
population cap set the City’s prison reform efforts back by at least a dec-
ade.168 The victims of this result were both the prisoners who were re-
turned to overcrowded prisons and the public that was forced to pay for 
them.169 The experience in Philadelphia is still relevant today; it shows 
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not only that release orders are “improvident,” but also that they are in-
dicative of a criminal justice system in need of comprehensive reform.170 
IV. Proactive Penology: States and the Fight against 
Overcrowding 
 Had mounting concern for prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights 
not been coupled with the sharp downturn of the American economy 
in 2008, many states might have persisted in their tepid attempts at 
prison reform.171 As it happened, though, the confluence of social and 
economic demand aroused states’ interest in more sustainable criminal 
justice models.172 It cannot be gainsaid that the demand for reform was 
a function of economy first and morality second; in an act of self-
preservation, politicians hastened to “do more with less” of their con-
stituents’ taxes.173 Nevertheless, the salutary effects of these efforts are 
important guideposts in the search for a tenable solution to prison 
overcrowding and privation.174 The most promising of these efforts 
have focused on three junctures in the criminal justice process: pretrial 
detention; sentencing; and release and reentry.175 
A. Minimizing Pretrial Detention 
 The news from Philadelphia has not been all bad; in fact, much of 
it has been good since January 2010, when new District Attorney R. 
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Seth Williams placed the city at the vanguard of efforts to reduce prison 
populations by reducing the number of pretrial detentions.176 
 Among these reforms were changes to the charging process.177 
During the post-release spike in crime in the early 1990s, the charging 
unit in the District Attorney’s office lacked the resources to conduct an 
exhaustive threshold inquiry for each of the thousands of matters that 
came before it.178 As a result, charges were often filed under a “prob-
able cause” standard that required minimal factual determinations.179 
These charges were often dropped or dismissed when their weakness 
was revealed at pretrial hearings, a time-consuming process that pre-
vented courts from focusing on the merits of a case.180 Meanwhile, 
criminal defendants were detained while waiting for dismissal of most, 
if not all, of their charges.181 To curb this “inefficient gatekeep[ing],” 
Williams raised the charging standard to the more rigorous “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” which allows prosecutors to file charges only if con-
viction is likely.182 The reduction in charges filed has resulted in fewer 
and shorter pretrial detentions.183 This in turn has reduced the pres-
sure on prison staff and resources, and the quality of treatment avail-
able to inmates has improved accordingly.184 
 Additionally, Philadelphia now requires all cases to pass through 
a “Discovery Court,” where evidentiary issues are resolved so that con-
tinuances do not delay the substantive trial indefinitely.185 As one ad-
ministrative judge has observed, an added benefit of Discovery Court 
is that it requires the prosecution and defense to “‘address the case in 
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a meaningful way earlier on’” so that, by the time it reaches trial, ar-
guments on the merits are clearly defined and the case is ripe for ad-
judication.186 Empirics have also confirmed the efficacy of Discovery 
Court: the number of cases with incomplete discovery in the Com-
mon Pleas Court dropped from sixty-one percent in 2009 to twenty-
one percent in 2010.187 
B. Making Sense of Sentencing 
 The determinate sentencing movement began in the 1970s, when 
rising crime rates prompted calls for state legislative sentencing com-
missions to prescribe uniform sentences and prevent judges from gra-
dating punishment based on the context in which a crime occurred.188 
The political expedience of determinate sentencing ensured that it be-
came the law in many states without full consideration of its long-term 
effects, and the result was an increase in prison populations and a de-
cline in prison living standards.189 Budgetary pressures, however, have 
forced jurisdictions to revisit their determinate sentencing laws, and the 
resulting statutory reform has generally pursued three goals: reclassify-
ing criminal offenses, strengthening alternatives to imprisonment, and 
reducing prison terms.190 
  The reclassification of drug crimes has itself taken three forms.191 
First, at least eight states have established sentencing committees tasked 
with undoing the work of their predecessors.192 The general trend 
among these commissions has been to prescribe lesser sentences for 
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certain crimes in the name of proportionality, fiscal responsibility, and 
rehabilitation.193 Second, states have reduced classification levels for 
possessory drug offenses, and some have converted possession of small 
amounts of marijuana to a fineable civil offense.194 Third, many states 
have raised the monetary threshold for low-level property crimes.195 
 States have invested even more energy in providing alternatives to 
imprisonment, particularly for drug-related offenses.196 To avoid futile 
and repeated stints in prison, drug offenders in many states are di-
verted to drug courts, which emphasize abuse treatment programs and 
evidence-based supervision.197 The success of these measures in Ken-
tucky shows that drug treatment programs hold the potential for sig-
nificant savings and declines in prison populations.198 In fact, the more 
than 1151 drug courts in the United States have been so successful that 
many states have begun diverting defendants to other “specialty courts” 
that are equipped to provide appropriate sentences and competent 
oversight.199 
 Sentencing reform has also sought to reduce the length of prison 
terms.200 Here, too, three trends have emerged.201 A number of states 
have reduced mandatory minimum sentences, particularly for drug 
offenses.202 Others have expanded accelerated discharge options by 
increasing the number of good-time credits available for good behavior 
and participation in educational and vocational programs.203 A third 
group of states has also decreased the prison population by reducing 
sentences for parole and probation violations and by eliminating sen-
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tences for certain low-level offenses.204 By moving toward a sentencing 
model that coheres with the goals of rehabilitation as well as fiscal and 
administrative constraints, states have allowed prisons to devote re-
sources to the inmates who need them most.205 
C. Revising Reentry Strategies 
 States have also begun to reduce prison overcrowding by aiding 
paroled prisoners as they reenter society.206 As others have observed, 
reentry is not simply the end of the criminal justice process; it is the 
goal toward which all aspects of the criminal justice system should be 
calibrated.207 The emphasis on reentry has been made possible by 
funding from the federal Second Chance Act, which some regard as 
the catalyst for “an era of innovation, with states seeing themselves as 
laboratories carrying out . . . social experiments on behalf of the na-
tion.”208 The states have done just that, pursuing reentry programs that 
strive to reduce recidivism and prevent additional prison terms.209 
 To this end, many states now subject new parolees to a risk-needs 
assessment designed to help parole officers create individualized reen-
try plans that account for the vulnerabilities of specific parolees.210 Re-
sources are generally allocated based on the parolee’s degree of risk, 
but all reentry plans are “front-loaded” because the risk of recidivism is 
highest in the days immediately after release.211 To bolster a parolee’s 
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chances for successful reintegration, state corrections offices have also 
begun to collaborate with other community resource centers to address 
parolees’ employment, housing, and health care needs.212 Programs in 
some states pursue rehabilitation even more aggressively, requiring in-
mates to participate in educational, vocational, and social programs 
while still in prison.213 
 States have also rethought the relationship between parole officer 
and parolee.214 Technical violations of parole terms no longer trigger 
an automatic return to prison; instead, officers employ graduated re-
sponses based on the nature of the violation, reserving imprisonment 
for the most extreme cases.215 Further, many officers now use an incen-
tivized model to encourage parole compliance through positive rein-
forcement, which preliminary studies have shown to be more effective 
than negative reinforcement.216 On the whole, states that have commit-
ted to parolees’ successful reentry have reaped the benefits in lower 
recidivism rates and lower prison populations.217 
V. Beyond the Bromides: A Real Prescription for Real Change 
 One of the greatest obstacles to prison reform has been the 
equivocality of its proponents.218 Quick to voice the need for change, 
many reformists hesitate to say what form that change should take.219 
The most common formulation is that employed by the majority in 
Brown v. Plata, which condemned California’s prisons but immediately 
offered that “[p]roper respect for the State” required the Court to ac-
cord California “considerable latitude” in implementing the prisoner 
release order.220 This federalist apologia has been recited so often that 
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it is now a matter of rote incantation—risk-averse jurists, politicians, 
and scholars need only invoke it to avoid positing a potentially unpopu-
lar solution to prison overcrowding.221 But as the facts of Plata demon-
strate, the need for such a solution is so dire that truisms will no longer 
do.222 The architects of the criminal justice system—prison administra-
tors, judges, and legislators—must discard old models for reform in 
favor of a blueprint for lasting change.223 
A. Prisons 
 The mandate that prisons do a better job of upholding the Eighth 
Amendment cannot stand alone.224 To ensure the success of this direc-
tive, “better” must be defined and ways of achieving it must be pre-
scribed.225 To this end, the federal government would do well to estab-
lish an independent entity resembling Missouri’s Constituent Services 
Office, which tracks grievance patterns among inmates in order to 
identify and remedy systemic problems with conditions of confine-
ment.226 The Constituent Services Office’s success suggests two possible 
roles for a federal counterpart.227 
 First, the federal entity can enumerate protocol and reporting 
standards for physical and mental healthcare so that staff can engage in 
more effective triage.228 With clearer requirements for how and when 
certain conditions should be treated, the number of egregious cases like 
the ones reported in Plata may decline.229 Likewise, sanitation standards 
and cleaning schedules for cells, bathrooms, and medical facilities can 
be communicated so as to eliminate the root causes of disease and infec-
tion.230 As Justice Alito suggested in his dissent in Plata, requiring semi-
regular cleanings would not be an onerous burden, and need only be 
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mandated to be effective.231 Limited resources would, of course, prevent 
delivery of perfect medical care and sanitation, but minimum standards 
would reduce the risk of clear violations of the Eighth Amendment.232 
Further, the enumerated standards for conditions of confinement will 
help to restore absolutism to the Eighth Amendment.233 If the PLRA 
invites prisons to “[o]perate on the [m]argins of [c]ruelty,” explicit 
standards will let prison personnel know exactly where those margins 
are, and courts will have an easier time determining when they have 
been crossed.234 
 The enforcement mechanism for this entity must include trained 
corrections officials with jurisdiction over federal and state prisons 
alike.235 This arrangement will no doubt raise concerns for state sover-
eignty, but in fact it contemplates a narrower role for the federal gov-
ernment than the one currently in place under the PLRA.236 Where 
the current system of graduated remedies is overseen by judges who 
lack the expertise to run social institutions, establishment of a federal 
entity would ensure that such authority is exercised only by trained ex-
perts.237 
B. The Judiciary 
 Prison reform may also benefit from changes in the judiciary’s 
handling of PLRA litigation.238 It is argued that, rather than attempting 
to divine congressional intent from the ambiguous terms of the PLRA, 
“courts should confine the statute’s application to the situations to 
which it clearly applies and those only.”239 Such an application of judi-
cial restraint would limit the possibility of judges subjugating the PLRA 
to their policy preferences, and would also encourage Congress to re-
visit the statute and endow its terms with clearer meaning.240 Addition-
ally, it is argued that this narrow approach is consistent with precedent 
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established by Miranda v. Arizona, where the Court limited the inquiry 
into whether a particular Miranda warning was needed by requiring it 
wherever there was “‘any doubt’” as to its necessity.241 
 While this approach addresses valid concerns about the scope of 
judicial authority, it construes PLRA litigation as a matter of abstract 
statutory interpretation and overlooks its constitutional implications.242 
Had such a narrow reading of the PLRA applied in Plata, hundreds of 
thousands of prisoners would have been barred from vindicating their 
Eighth Amendment rights and, as Coleman v. Wilson shows, decades can 
pass before a prisoner obtains final disposition of his case.243 To that 
end, the above comparison to Miranda is also flawed; the rule articu-
lated in that case was not when in doubt, defer, but rather, when in 
doubt, defer to the party whose constitutional rights are in jeopardy.244 This is 
consistent with the insuperable nature of constitutional rights, and 
teaches that the Court can and should favor those rights when adopting 
rules of construction.245 
 In the future, the Court should read the PLRA’s terms to favor 
more aggressive remedial plans.246 The “needs-narrowness-
intrusiveness” test should no longer be used to sidestep release orders, 
and the “reasonable amount of time to comply” provision for graduated 
remedies should be limited.247 In addition to favoring express constitu-
tional rights over abstract federalist concerns, the increased possibility of 
release orders under this approach would encourage prompt reconsid-
eration of the PLRA by Congress.248 If possible, the Court should also 
strive to make its next reading of the PLRA a unanimous one.249 Provid-
ing clear precedent would obviate the need for trial and appellate 
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courts to engage in semantic excurses, and prisoners’ rights would be 
vindicated more quickly.250 
C. Congress 
 The academy to this point has recommended only that the PLRA 
be amended, but the time for piecemeal reform has passed.251 Instead 
of delaying change at prisoners’ expense, Congress should repeal or 
substantially amend the PLRA to protect their rights more fully.252 In 
considering the PLRA’s replacement, Congress should avail of the 
many state experiments to reduce prison overcrowding that have been 
conducted in recent years.253 As discussed in Part IV of this Note, 
methods for addressing substandard prison conditions and the predi-
cate overcrowding have taken three forms, the latter two of which, sen-
tencing reform and renewed emphasis on successful reentry, are within 
Congress’s purview.254 
 Congress should begin by repealing the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 and restoring judicial discretion in sentencing.255 Of course, 
abrupt repeal of the Act raises concerns.256 It is true that the judiciary is 
underequipped to render perfect sentences in all instances, but this 
should not bar judges from any consideration of mitigating circum-
stances when imposing a sentence.257 To reconcile the need for flexibil-
ity with the need to cabin judicial discretion, Congress should prescribe 
broad parameters for sentencing, articulated with the advice of correc-
tions experts.258 To the extent that these new parameters would them-
selves be a form of determinate sentencing, they would at least be 
grounded in experience, not emotion.259 Short of summary repeal of 
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the Sentencing Reform Act, the experiences of the states indicate that 
the reclassification of crimes, reduction of sentences, and introduction 
of alternative treatment programs for drug offenders would all reduce 
rates of incarceration and relieve stress on prison resources.260 
 Congress should also emulate the reentry programs pioneered by 
the states.261 First, Congress should expand remedial programs that 
begin during imprisonment.262 Educational, vocational, and behavioral 
programs have all been shown to facilitate successful reentry.263 In 
keeping with this, Congress should establish a Parolees’ Support Ser-
vice to create individualized reentry plans for prisoners and coordinate 
community resources to provide support during the initial phase of re-
entry, when the risk of recidivism is highest.264 Finally, Congress should 
pass laws encouraging innovation by parole officers.265 Several states 
have incorporated incentivized parole programs already, and there is 
reason to believe this approach would succeed nationally as well.266 
Conclusion 
 The rise of the American prison state was a function of social anxi-
ety and political opportunism. Draconian sentencing policies impris-
oned Americans in record numbers and, by the close of the twentieth 
century, prison systems were so overburdened that those same Ameri-
cans began to suffer and die behind prison walls. Worse still was the 
PLRA’s denial of the opportunity for redress in all but the most ex-
treme cases. Enacted under minimal legislative scrutiny, the PLRA cur-
tailed prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights by limiting the circum-
stances in which they could be asserted and the remedies that courts 
could provide for their violation. It comes as no surprise that one of the 
extreme cases heralded by the PLRA found its way to the Supreme 
Court in Brown v. Plata. There, the Court was forced to choose between 
two evils, neither of which was truly lesser than the other. Perpetuating 
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a system of cruel and unusual punishment was no more desirable than 
releasing its inhabitants into the general public but, in the end, the 
Court found that this was the only conscionable—and, indeed, the only 
constitutional—choice. 
 It remains to be seen whether history will remember Brown v. Plata 
as a tragedy or as a turning point. The call for change, however, has 
been sounded anew, and a number of states have already answered it. 
The purpose of this Note has been to provide a template for similar 
change nationally and to express hope that it will come. As the Bard 
once wrote, “Tis a consummation devoutly to be wished.”267 
 
267 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 3, sc. 1. 
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